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MYTHICAL CRITICISM 
An Evaluation of Rudolf Bultmann 
Robert H. Gutheil 
Adviser: Dr. A. C. Piepkorn 
Rudolf Bultmann has not lacked his champions. For 
many, he is almost Martin Luther redivivus. Others see 
him as Satan incarnatus. No matter which is the stronger 
influence, we cannot escape the undeniable importance of 
this man. He is a devout churchman; a keen, critical 
scholar of the Bible; and a disciple of Martin Heidegger. 
His way of doing theology has begun a new chapter in the 
history of interpretation. 
If Bultmann's own scholarly output has been prodi-
gious, the theological dialogue which he has engendered 
has been overwhelming. A paper of this scope could not 
begin to assimilate all of the relevant material. It will 
be our specific purpose in the next few pages to outline 
the principle features of Bultmann's mythical criticism--
his call for demythologization and his existential inter-
pretation of the kerygma. Also, we shall briefly investi-
gate the directions in which Bultmann's thought has been 
developed by his leading followers. We shall conclude 
with some general observations concerning the function of 
myth in literature and the validity of mythical criticism 
for Biblical exegesis. 
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All his early writings indicated the direction in 
which Bultmann was heading, but the essay which really 
began the entire debate and brought into sharp focus the 
program which he had in mind was "New Testament and Myth-
ology," published in 1941. He begins by leaving no doubt 
as to which aspects of the New Testament fall under the 
heading "myth." Not only the three-storied view of the 
universe, but all the passages which speak of good and 
evil spirits at work in the universe, everything that 
points to supernatural intervention in the earthly process--
all this is mythical. Our creedal statements are all 
embedded in the mythical framework--God sending His Son 
to earth to die on a cross and then raising Him from the 
dead, the consequent defeat of death and evil spirits, 
the ascent into the clouds with the promise to return at 
the end of the world, the believer's involvement in this 
salvation through baptism and eucharist--"all this is the 
language of mythology, and the origin of the various 
themes can be easily traced in the contemporary mythology 
of Jewish Apocalyptic and in the redemption myths of 
Gnosticism."1 For Bultmann, myth is that which speaks of 
God and His action as objective and observable, immanent 
in this world. "Myths give to the transcendent reality an 
immanent, this-worldly objectivity."2 These words are 
always chosen with extreme care, for Bultmann wishes to 
be very clear as to what he is doing. When he speaks 
about myth or the nature of miracles or acts of God, he 
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does not at all insist that God does not act in behalf of 
men. He only insists that the action of God is observable 
only to faith. He has said this a number of times in a 
number of ways, and it is absolutely necessary that we be 
clear about this. For instance, in his article, "Bultmann 
Replies to his Critics," he says, "Faith, which speaks of 
its encounter with the acts of God, cannot defend itself 
against the charge of illusion, for the encounter with 
God is not objective like a worldly event."3 And then 
two paragraphs later, "That God cannot be seen apart from 
faith does not mean that he does not exist apart from it."4  
And so when he speaks of myths of the incarnation or 
resurrection, he is not saying that the incarnation and 
resurrection stories are fictitious legends which have a 
religious or spiritual meaning. He is saying that the 
reality of the incarnation and the resurrection is not 
susceptible to scientific, historical proof, but is 
observable only to eyes of faith. 
But even more than this, the question of historical 
accuracy is itself not at all a main concern. The acts 
themselves have a secondary importance outside of the con-
text of faith. To use our traditional terminology, a man 
goes to hell even though God's Son died on the cross and rose 
again for him if he does not believe that this is so and re-
spond in faith to this action of God. The crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ as isolated historical events 
or as abstract propositions must be brought into the present 
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in order to.work their power. The contents of the word of 
Christ, says Bultmann, "may also be formulated in a series 
of abstract propositions," but "abstract propositions can 
only become the Word of God when it is proelamation--i.e. 
when it takes the shape of an event here and now in the 
viva vox--that is the eschatological meaning of the 447/AR.115 
There is a certain denigrating of history in all tas, 
and Bultmann has been reproached by a number of critics 
for his loss of the historical emphases in Christianity. 
We shall discuss the relation of demythologization and 
history later. At this point it is important that we see 
that in his strong emphasis on the present meaning of 
Christian faith, Bultmann does not feel it necessary to 
deny the reality of God's acts in history. This is the 
error of an earlier liberal theology to which he is as 
strongly opposed as is Karl Barth. In fact, Thomas Oden 
has noted the interesting situation that "the energies now 
being put into a new quest for the historical Jesus are 
being expended, significantly enough, not by those attacking 
Bultmann for his lack of historical rootage for faith, but 
precisely by Bultmann's closest associates and students."6  
Moreover, those who are so concerned about thifiaistorie, 
objective nature of the saving events are victims of a 
kind of schizophrenic approach to the problem. Carl Braaten 
has made the incisive statement, 
On the one hand the historical facts in 
question are said to be objective in the 
sense that they may be ascertained and 
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established by scientific historical 
methods, while on the other hand, the 
redemptive occurrences are supposedly 
accessible am such only to faith. Now, 
which is it?' 
Why demythologize? The first answer that has been 
given is that the Biblical message is patently set within 
a world view that is in many ways antithetical to the 
world view of modern man. Then liwwasl• neeees4rt to see 
that to speak of the world view of the first century as 
mythical does not necessarily flatly contradict a tradi- 
tional understanding of the historical nature of the saving 
events. Finally, waultmannuintistsAhatr—ibis ultimate 
reason for demythologizing is that the Gospel may be preached. 
All too often the Gospel simply does not get a hearing 
because our scientifically-minded age has no room for 
spirits, good or evil, directly involved in the course of 
worldly history. Replying to Karl Jaspers, Bultmann said, 
The purpose of demythologization is 
not to make religion more acceptable 
to modern man by trimming the tradi-
tional Biblical texts, but to make 
clearer to modern man what the Chris-
tian faith is. He must be confronted 
with the issue of decision, be pro-
voked to decision by the fact that the 
stumbling block to faith, the skAndalon, 
is peculiarly disturbing to man in 
general, not only to modern man. . . . 
Such an attempt does not aim at reas-
suring modern man by saying to him: 
"You no longer have to believe this 
and that." To be sure, it says this 
among other things, and may thereby 
relieve his pangs of conscience; but 
if it does so, it does so not by 
showing him that the number of things 
to be believed is smaller than he had 
thought, but because it shows him that 
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to believe at all is qualitatively dif-
ferent from acceRting a certain number 
of propositions.° 
In this connection, Bultmann insists on his own close 
association with Llitifer! a-. way ttft tbiAking:? r- Veimythazigig lag 
is not only permissible, it is necessary, in order to 
insure th vitality of a faith fixed on the proper focal 
points. As he has said repeatedly, 
Demythologizing is the radical appli-
cation of the doctrine of justification 
by faith to the sphere of knowledge and 
thought. Like the doctrine of justifi-
cation, demythologizing destroys every 
longing for security. There is no dif-
ference between security based on good 
works and security built on objectifying 
knowledge. . . . He who abandons every 
form of security shall find the true 
security.Y 
We have now come to the question of what happens when 
Bultmann demythologizes. The answer has been indicated in 
what we have already said. One of Bultmann's characteristic 
emphases is the fact that you cannot interpretlin arvaamm. 
You cannot approach the Biblical material in an absolutely 
cold and objective fashion. The basic presupposition for 
every form of exegesis is that "your own relation to the 
subject-matter prompts the question you bring to the text 
and elicits the answers you obtain from the text."1° The 
approach which you favor is your hermeneutic, and you are 
far ahead in the game if you realize that you must have a 
hermeneutical principle, and therefore you choose one with 
care. Bultmann has approached the problem head-on. Since 
every interpreter is dependent on conceptions which he has 
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inherited from a philosophical tradition, "our question is 
simply which philosophy today offers the most adequate 
perspective and conceptions for understanding human exist-
ence. Here it seems to me that we should learn from 
existentialist philosophy."11 Here lies Bultmann's famed 
relation to Martin Heidegger. John Macquarrie's comment on 
the relation of Biblical and existentialist thought is 
instructive: 
What existentialism teaches about the 
being of man has a certain kinship 
and sympathy with the understanding of 
his being implicit in biblical thought, 
so that the theologian who approaches 
the Bible with an existentialist under-
standing of being is likely to interpret 
its teaching in a way which would be 
faithful to the authentic thought of 
the biblical writers themselves.12  
Bultmann's major debt to existentialism lies in his under-
standing of eschatology, and this in turn relates to 
history--specifically, the relation between universal 
history and personal history. This he develops at great 
length in his Gifford Lectures. The point is clear: 
The meaning in history lies always in 
the present, and when the present is 
conceived as the eschatological pre-
sent. by Christian faith the meaning 
in history is realized. . . . Always 
in your present lies the meaning in 
history, and you cannot see it as a 
spectator, but only in your responsible 
decisions.13 
This is the heart of Bultmann's existentialist theology (and 
we should note that Bultmann demythologizes because of his 
commitment to existentialist interpretation, and not vice-
versa--demythologizing is really a secondary concern). The 
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overarching concern is for a life of decision called into 
question in the present, and his theological thrusts may 
be sorted out under this heading. If we demythologize, 
we do so in order to have the Biblical message confront us 
in the present, and here we should note what Bultmann says 
about Biblical eschatology. In a very real sense, history 
ended in Jesus Christ, and Bultmann sees Biblical precedent 
in making this emphasis. The process of demythologizing 
the early Christian conception of Jesus began partially 
with Paul, and radically with John. Although Paul still 
expected the end of the world as a cosmic drama, "with the 
resurrection of Christ the decisive event has already 
happened."14 But for the more radical John, "the coming 
and departing of Jesus.is!the::esdhatologicalyevent. 
The resurrection:of,Jesus;. Pentecost and the parousia of 
Jesus are one and the same event, and those who believe 
have already eternal life."15 As Bultmann demythologizes 
eschatology, he has some creative insights--"As in the 
conception of heaven the transcendence of God is imagined 
by means of the category of space, so in the conception of 
the end of the world, the idea of the transcendence of God 
is imagined by means of the category of time."16 In the 
face of this transcendence, the world is empty in its 
transitoriness. But it is also empty "because men have 
turned it into a place in which evil spreads and sin rules. 
The end of the world, therefore, is the judgment of 'God."17  
Further, "the end of the world has not only a negative but 
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also a positive meaning. To use nonmythological terms, the 
finiteness of the world and of man over against the trans-
cendent power of God contains not only warning, but also 
consolation."18"'The function of New Testament eschatology, 
then, once we rid it of its Jewish apocalyptic trappings, 
is to point to the direct confrontation of God and man in 
an ever-present eschatological Now. But at this moment of 
confrontation, another element is also always present--
the eschatological event of Jesus Christ. This brings into 
focus the remaining elements in Bultmann's thought. The 
moment of confrontation, of decision, is radically different 
for Christian and non-Christian. Here is the kerygma which 
Bultmann is so insistent upon preserving. Here is where 
the choice is made between authentic and inauthentic exist-
ence. Here is where the power of preaching creates faith. 
It is in this concern for the present that existential 
philosophy makes its contribution to man's understanding. 
Existentialism insists that man is a historical being, and 
his existence is true only in the present acts of existing: 
He realizes his existence if he is aware 
that each "now" is the moment of free 
decision: What element in his past is to 
retain value? What is his responsibility 
toward his future, since no one can take 
the place of another? No one can take 
another's placeA since every man must die 
his own death. 
And yet for all the value of existentialist philosophy in 
clarifying man's position and the poles of his existence, 
we must see that its function is purely preliminary. It 
brings clarification and understanding, but not power. It 
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tells man his condition, but it does not release him from 
it: "Existential philosophy, while it gives no answer to 
the question of my personal existence, makes personal 1; 
existence my own personal responsibility, and by doing so 
it helps to make me open to the word of the Bible."2° In 
his essay, "Humanism and Christianity," Bultmann has care-
fully explained the difference between faith and non-faith 
at the moment of decision. As always, he goes out of his 
way to be scrupulously fair in evaluating both sides of the 
picture. Humanism is not the presumptuous faith in man that 
sets man above all. Rather, 
humanistic faith is faith in the idea of - 
man which stands as a norm above his 
em ►irieah: life, prescribIng-hia - dutyand 
thereby bestowing upon him dignity and 
nobility. Humanism is faith in the 
spirit of which man partakes, the spirit 
by whose power man creates the world of 
the true, the good, the beautiful, in 
science and philosophy, in law and in art.21  
And further, 
for humanism there is genuine freedom 
only in the acknowledgment and acceptance 
of a norm superior to the subjective, 
arbitrary will. The freedom of subjective 
arbitrariness is a delusion, for it delivers 
man up to his drives to do just that at any 
moment vi4Ach at the moment lust and passion 
dictate. 
Finally, "autonomy, understood in its genuine sense, is 
theonomy, for the law of the spirit which is consented to 
in freedom is the law of God."23 But, having cited human-
ism's value, we must point up its differences from Chris-
tianity--differences which lie in the realm of the Beyond. 
For humanism God's Beyond is spirit of 
which man with his spirit partakes. . . 
For the Christian understanding, God is 
always the hidden one and the coming 
one. God's Beyond is his constant 
futurity, his constant being-out-
before. With this transcendent God 
man has companion only in openness to 
the future. 
The either-or of humanism and Christianity ultimately is 
this: "Does man will to live his life by his own resources, 
his own power, or by the grace of God? . . As the Chris-
tian faith knows that man receives his real life not from 
the law but by grace, it also knows that it is precisely 
grace which provides the power to fulfil the law."25 And 
now, to be very explicit, to reach the essential point, 
"This word of grace has been made concrete in Jesus Christ, 
who is present as the word of God in the proclamation of 
the church.n26 
Here we are face-to-face with Bultmann's understanding 
of Jesus Christ as eschatological event. It is in this 
connection that he advances his controversial views on the 
significance of the crucifixion and resurrection. "According 
to the New Testament the decisive significance of Jesus 
Christ is that he--in his person, his coming, his passion, 
and his glorification--is the eschatological event."27 The 
eschatological event of Jesus Christ is a once-for-all event. 
"Once for all" is not the uniqueness of an 
historical event but means that a particular 
historical event, that is, Jesus Christ, is 
to be understood as the eschatological "once 
for all." As an eschatological event this 
"once for all" is always present in the 
proclaimed word, not as a timelms truth, 
but as happening here and now."4° 
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And what is achieved in this moment of decision? Through 
God's grace in Jesus Christ, the believer gains his self 
by losing his self. He is open to the future, while the 
possibilities of the future bring only anxiety and fear 
to the non-Christian. "The future always offers to man 
the gift of freedom--Christian faith is the power to grasp 
this gift."29 And again: "The New Testament speaks and faith 
knows of an act of God through which man becomes capable of 
self-commitment, capable of faith and love, of his authentic 
life."30 And so man is always what he is at the present 
moment of decision--"The adjective 'Christian' can never 
qualify the substantive character. Only the decision of 
each new moment can be called 'Christian.'"31  
When we speak of the eschatological event of Jesus 
Christ, we are speaking, first and foremost, about cruci-
fixion and resurrection. Bultmann presents his views about 
this clearly and succinctly in "New Testament and Mythology." 
It is the cross which is the central event in Christianity. 
It is the crucifixion, not the resurrection, which is the 
true stumbling-block of Christian faith--the skandalon that 
all of God's power is concentrated in a naked man dying on 
a cross. "The abiding significance of the cross is that it 
is the judgement of the world, the judgement and the deliver-
ance of man."32 Through the power of the cross we are cruci-
fied with Christ--we lose our life, and therefore are 
capable of finding it. At each eschatological moment of 
decision in our lives, the cross of Christ gives us the 
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power to choose authentic existence--"If it is true that the 
Christian faith involves free openness to the future, then 
it is freedom from anxiety in the face of the Nothing. For 
this freedom nobody can decide of his own will; it can only 
be given, in faith."33 The cross of Christ is not merely 
mythical; it is an actual, observable, ,historical event. 
But it is not merely this, either. It is a historical event 
with cosmic significance, an event which reaches into each 
present moment with its power. And here lies its connection 
with the resurrection: 
The meaning of the cross is not disclosed 
from the life of Jesus as a figure of past 
history, a life which needs to be reproduced 
by historical research. On the contrary, 
Jesus is not proclaimed merely as the 
crucified; he is also risen from the dead. 
The cross and the resurrection form an 
inseparable unity. 
What, then, is their relationship? 
The resurrection is not a mythical event 
adduced in order to prove the saving 
efficacy of the cross, but an article of 
faith just as much as the meaning of the 
cross itself. Indeed, faith in the  
resurrection is really the same thing as  
faith in the saving efficacy of the cross.35  
And again, "If the event of Easter Day is in any sense a 
historical event additional to the event of the cross, it 
is nothing else than the rise of faith in the risen Lord, 
since it was this faith which led to the apostolic preaching."36  
TheranistnbedenyingthatoBultpannlis logioailytconbistenti 
at this point. The reason for his views lies in his insist-
ence on existentialist theology, not in his demand for 
demythologization. Christianity provides power for the ever- 
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present moments of decision in personal existence. Faith 
in the cross brings the power to crucify the self, to trust 
solely in God to care for the future, to choose the self-
less options of love and sacrifice. The resurrection puts 
the seal on this. It is an affirmation of our faith in the 
cross. As we have died in the crucifixion, we have new life 
in the resurrection. The only historicaNydemonstrable fact 
of that first Easter is that the disciples were new men. 
Their faith had risen. Did Jesus actually rise from the 
dead? At one;:: _>: level of existence the answer must be 
yes, for the disciples demonstrated the power of the 
resurrection. In their lives and faith, He had risen. The 
moments of decision in their lives confirmed this. Jesus 
rose in their kerygma, in their preaching. Is the resur-
rection an event that can be tested by scientific measure-
ment? No, "the resurrection cannot be a miraculous proof 
capable of demonstration and sufficient to convince the 
sceptic that the cross really has the cosmic and eschato-
logical significance ascribed to it."37 Was the tomb actually 
empty? Only to eyes of faith. And, existentially speaking, 
it is beside the point anyway. Crucifixion and resurrection 
are one eschatological event in the life of the Christian. 
At this point we must develop questions and answers 
hinted at in this understanding. How do we come to believe 
in the cross as thef',cross of Christ and as the eschatological 
event? There is only one answer--through preaching. "Christ 
meets us in the preaching as one crucified and risen. He 
15 
meets.us in the word of preaching and nowhere else. The 
faith of Easter is just this--faith in the word of preaching."38  
One of the strtlang assets of Bultmann's theology has been 
his pointing up again the central significance of preaching 
in the work of the church. In fact, for Bultmann, one of the 
great glories of the church is that this is where the proclama-
tion is continued and carried on. The emphasis is decidedly a 
traditional one: God comes to us in His Word. 
God meets us in His Word, in a concrete 
word, the preaching instituted in Jesus 
Christ. While it may be said that God 
meets us always and everywhere, we do 
not see and hear Him always and every-
where, unless His Word supervenes and 
enables us to understand the moment here 
and now.39 
God's Word is not existential philosophy. Even more to the 
point, it is a Word rooted in history. Here Bultmann sees 
one avenue by which he can approach those who are put off 
by his lack of historical consciousness--"This living Word 
of God is not invented by the human spirit and by human 
sagacity; it rises up in history. Its origin is an historical 
event, by which the -speaking of this word, the preaching, is 
rendered authoritative and legitimate. This event is Jesus 
Christ."40 What is normative for Christian faith is precisely 
a historical event, but an event that has present significance. 
This is the kerygma, the proclamation of the saving act of 
God-- 
The kerygma maintains that the eschatological 
emissary of God is a concrete figure of a 
particular historical past, that his eschato-
logical activity was wrought out in a human 
fate, and that therefore it is an event whose 
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eschatological chare-ter does not admit 
of a secular proof."1  
The kerygma is that which cannot be demythologized; God 
has specifically acted for man in Jesus Christ. And yet 
this kerygma is not simply the announcement that Jesus died 
on the cross and rose again. Kerygma, proclamation, 
preaching, brings the, event into the present. It is a call 
to a decision for authentic existence. As Bultmann describes 
it in his Theology of the New Testament, the proclaimed 
word 
is kerygma--herald's service--in the 
literal sense--authorized, plenipotent 
proclamation, edict from a sovereign. 
Its promulgation requires authorized 
messengers, "heralds," "apostles" (= 
sent men)(Rom. 10:13-17). So it is, 
by nature, personal address which ac-
costs each individual, throwing the 
person himself into question by render-
ing his self-understanding problewatic, 
and demanding a decision of him.m'‘ 
This dual aspect of kerygma (historical fact and personal 
address) is necessary to rescue preaching from the charge 
of being a history lecture, on the one hand, or a lecture in 
humanistic ethics on the other. Kerygma is the preaching of 
an event, but it cannot take a- completely objective form 
since it calls men into question in the multiplicity of 
their actions. Erich Dinkier, one of Bultmann's closest 
followers, summarizes Bultmann's position in this way: 
The kerygma in the New Testament contains 
the calling and challenging Word of God 
occurring in the redemptive act of Christ, 
the Word of God spoken in the man Jesus 
of Nazareth once for all, Og-17- -- . This 
ke a, the proclamation of God as acting 
n the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ 
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for us, is part of the paradoxical event 
and cannot be oNectified if it is under-
stood in faith. 
And this leads us to the final aspect of Bultmann's 
thought--the role of faith. Faith is not the abandoning of 
the modern world view for the world view of the first cen-
tury. It is not merely intellectual assent that certain 
things happened at certain times two thousand years ago, or 
agreement about a body of doctrine concerning these events. 
Faith is commitment of oneself to the life revealed in Jesus 
Christ. It is an agreement to live up to the obedience 
demanded by God, and a seizing of the power God gives to 
obey those demands. It is sacrificing oneself in every 
present decision in order to gain one's self, in order to 
become a new being. It is trust in God above all things. 
As Bultmann says it, faith "is both the demand of and the 
gift offered by preaching. Faith is the answer to the 
message. Faith is the abandonment of man's own security, 
and the readiness to find security only in the unseen 
beyond, in God."44 And more: "Faith in the sense of obedient 
self-commitment and inward detachment from the world is only 
possible when it is faith in Jesus Christ."45  
"The purpose of my existential interpretation of myth is 
precisely to inquire into the possibility of a valid meaning 
for the mythical picture of the world, and in this I am 
trying to proceed methodically, n46  says Bultmann. This 
remark, directed against the "arbitrary assertions" of Karl 
Barth, is a clue to the radical honesty and integrity,4ith 
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which Bultmann approaches his task. Starting from the fine 
vantage point of taking the secular world seriously, he is 
making one of the most significant attempts of our time to 
communicate with "a world come of age" (in Bonhoeffer's 
later happy phrase). But because his approach is radical, 
because he has made concessions which have not been made 
before, a number of men have attacked him at a number of 
points. Many of the questions asked are valid (although 
some could only stem from reading him carelessly or 
belligerently), and facile answers which explain away 
every objection accomplish nothing. 
One of the major legitimate criticisms of Bultmann 
is that he has lost the historical nature of the Biblical 
revelation, the pattern of Heilsgesohichte which is the 
heart of the Biblical message. This criticism comes from 
a number of respected figures concerned with Lutheran or 
Roman Catholic orthodoxy-Walter Kunneth, Ernst Kinder, 
Paul Althaus, Ludwig Ott, Karl Adam, to name a few. Oscar 
Oullmann's remarks are relevant here, as he notes that the 
foolishness of the cross 
is not, as Bultmann thinks, a faith 
in that which is not within man's 
control and at his disposal. That 
faith many Greeks would have been 
able to accept and to express with 
the aid of real myths. But that 
the redemptive act is an historical 
datum, that was "foolishness for 
Greek thgught and is that for modern 
thought.'ff 
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As we shall see, this criticism applies much more to Fritz 
Burl and Schubert Ogden than to Bultmann, but it does point 
up the historical problem in BultmannI s theology. In dealing 
with this, we must realize that the objection works with a 
particular conception of history--history understood as a 
process which takes place within a stable metaphysical 
framework. This understanding was almost certainly that of 
the Biblical writers and undoubtedly that of the Middle 
Ages, but this does not mean that it is necessarily normative 
for us. Bultmann has developed his answer in his Gifford 
Lectures, but in this connection he draws on the work of a 
colleague very close to him in his general theological 
outlook. This colleague is Friedrich Gogarten, and his 
book, Demythologizing and History, is an attempt to speak to 
this point. Within the historical approach to theology, 
according to Gogarten, two points of view are discernible, 
each guided by its own concept of history. One is the 
"official" theology of the church, which thinks in terms 
of objective historical happenings on which Christian faith 
can be based. But the existential view of history, a view 
which has its roots in Dilthey and Troeltsch, maintains that 
history is not an object which can be viewed from the out-
side. Rather, personal involvement is absolutely necessary--
"Modern man is able to envisage history only from the point 
of view of his own responsibility for it."48 Again, "whenever 
one is concerned with history one is concerned also with 
the historical character (Geschichtlichkeit) of human 
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existence. . . . This means that the historical character of 
human existence is involved in every approach to history. 
Therefore, faith can never be established by demonstrating 
that certain objective happenings took place in the past. 
with arises on the basis of an existential interpretation 
of the sacred history, which lets us see it as the disclosure 
of our own historical existence, responsible under the Word 
of God. It is interesting to note that Gogarten insists 
that this existential understanding was Luther's understanding, 
lying behind his sole fide principle. Whether Luther's name 
is invoked or not, it is obvious that this radical shifting 
of the historical nature of faith, from a series of saving 
events in the process of the world to the history of a 
personal existence, will not satisfy everyone. And yet 
ita. can be argued; that the one understanding is as legitimate 
as the other, or (avoldiagamititagntsopitfallootnauttal 
ezclusidm). one is as necessary as the other. In any case, 
although existentialist interpretation forsakes the "official" 
understanding of history, demythologization as such does not 
necessarily do so, as we have seen from all that Bultmann has 
said about the nature of myth. 
Associated with the historical criticism is the complaint 
about the loss of the corporate nature of Christian faith in 
Bultmann's great insistence on the personal character of 
faith. To a certain extent this is true, although his 
equally strong emphasis on existential encounter offsets this 
somewhat. At the same time, Krister Stendahi, noting that 
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Bultmann is not faithful to Pauline theology in this regard, 
also observes that Bultmann is not much further away from 
Paul than Augustine and Luther, with their great concern for 
introspection and individual reconciliation.50  
Probably the greatest protest against Bultmann's theo-
logy has been directed against his conception of the 
resurrection gaining significance dieLe4pethebdgh Itsliaftielpa-
tion in the event of the cross. But it must also be remem-
bered that for this very reason Bultmann says that the 
resurrection is not a mythological occurrence, but an 
eschatological event. Roy Harrisville reminds us that 
Bultmann's interpretation "does not constitute an outright 
denial of the objective facticity of the resurrection, but 
rather the possibility of its verification."51 Again, in 
his existential approach, Bultmann is working within a 
tradition of history which states that "there is no truth 
apart from engagement in it."52 The entire question is an 
exceedingly complex one, and we cannot investigate all the 
avenues of inquiry here. It may well be asked if what 
Bultmann says about the meaning of the resurrection is 
completely faithfUl'to the Biblical witness, since Paul 
himself states that he can only proclaim the word of the 
cross as Gospel because of the resurrection. mu difficult 
to make the Bible say that the resurrection is subordinate 
to the cross, or can stand merely as an introduction to or 
a faithful response to the cross. Much more can and must be 
said about the resurrection than Bultmann does. And yet we 
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must see that what he does say is a valid and important 
emphasis, even if it does not constitute the whole truth. 
In terms of the approach to life as being lived in encounter, 
with decision in the present moment of paramount importance 
for existence, this understanding of the power of the 
resurrection is necessary. What Bultmann says has been 
picked up a number of times in the preaching of the resur-
rection, and rightfully so. For example, a fine popular 
treatment of the work of the Holy Spirit in Creating 
resurrection faith unmistakably echoes Bultmann's emphasis-- 
What Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit 
are concerned about is that the resuk-
rection must happen in our hearts, not  
simply that Christ must rise from the  
dead. He has risen from the dead. His 
task now is to rise in our hearts. Only 
if we proclaim His resurrection can He 
do this. All the work of God in Jesus 
Christ comes to nothing unless He does 
rise in us.53 
By way of transition we may mention the criticism of 
Bultmann that he renders theology unnecessary in his exten-
sive use of existential philosophy. That he makes use of 
philosophy, particularly Heidegger's existentialia, is 
patently true. Whether theology is rendered unnecessary 
in the process is another question. Existentialist.philo-
aophy, for Heidegger and others, attempts to find categories 
in which to describe the form and structure of existence. 
Heidegger characterizes human existence as care (Sorge), 
and this has a threefold structure. First, there is 
possibility, the fact that "man's being gets projected ahead 
of itself."54 This is reflected in Bultmann's constant 
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allusions to man's openness to the future. Second, there is 
facticity, the influence of man's environment upon him, man's 
"thrownness." "Man is thrown into a world to exist there in 
his situation."55 Basically, man's anxiety reveals this 
aspect of his existence to him. Third, there is fallenness--
Nan flees from the disclosure of anxiety to lose himself in 
absorption with his instrumental world, or to bury himself 
in the anonymous impersonal existence of the mass, where no 
one is responsible."56 When this happens, man has fallen 
from the possibility of authentic existence into inauthentic 
existence. Now, how does one rise above inauthentic exist-
ence? Bultmann has used Heidegger's existential analysis 
of the human situation to great profit, but when it comes to 
the question of coping with the problems of existence, they 
part company. Heidegger, in his later thought, moves on to 
a consideration of conscience, a coming to terms with the 
fact of death and the confrontation with the "nothing," and 
an involvement in "being;" eventually he reaches a mystical 
region of thought somewhat analogous to Zen Buddhism. This 
later development will be discussed more fully below. Bult-
mann picks up some of these thrusts, but he differs basically 
as to how freedom from care is to be accomplished. He in-
sists that one cannot achieve freedom on one's own--power 
only comes through the kerygma, the proclamation Of the 
eschatological event of Jesus Christ. It is the kerygma 
which differentiates Christianity from secular philosophy, 
and Bultmann will not surrender this. As he says in a 
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typical passage, 
In the fact that existentialist philosophy 
does not take into account the relation 
between man and God, the confession is 
implied that I cannot speak of God as my 
God by looking into myself. My personal 
relation with God-can be made real by God 
only, by the acting God who meets me in 
His Word.57 
A more substantial criticism of Bultmann's use of 
existentialist philosophy comes from his left (all the 
criticisms we have considered come from the orthodox 
group to his right). From this quarter the complaint comes 
that Bultmann is not consistent in his use of existentialism, 
that he cannot stop short of demythologizing the kerygma. 
Thisaeads us into a consideration of the ways Bultmannts 
thogght has been developed by "post-Bultmannian" theologians. 
One of the leading figures in the demand for "dekerygmatiza-
tion" is the German theologian, Fritz Burt. Drawing on 
Jaspers (as Bultmann draws on Heidegger), Buri insists, in 
his "theology of existence," that "grace and revelation are 
not given in a special act, but are given with existence 
itself."58 Christianity offers nothing that cannot be gained 
in philosophy. Its value lies in the almost unique depth of 
existential insight available in Christian mythology, and it 
is the task of theologians to exegize this Christian mythology. 
Butt's call for dekerygmatization has been brought into 
prominence in America by Schubert Ogden. In his book, Christ 
Without Myth, Ogden especially takes Bultmann to task for a 
"structural inconsistency" in his theology. On the one band, 
Bultmann holds that authentic existence is possible to man as 
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man, but on the other hand authentic existence is possible 
for man only through faith in Jesus Christ. Summarizing 
Bultmann's argument, Ogden says that Bultmann 
introduces the distinction between a 
"possibility in principle" and a 
"possibility in fact." He argues that, 
although the natural man has the possibility 
in principle of understanding himself 
authentically, he does not have this 
possibility in fact, since, as he 
actually exists, he has always lost 
this possibility and can recover it 
only in consequence of God's act in 
Jesus Christ. Y 
For Ogden this is an inconsistent position, and he cites 
Kant as hit authority--"Du kannst, denn du solist; and unless 
this rule can be shown to be false--and, as we have indicated--
it appears to be self-evident--the conclusion just drawn 
cannot be evaded.u60  Ogden assumes his position with a 
number of theologians of the "left" whom he names, as he 
accepts the first proposition and denies the second-it is 
true that man has. the _possibility of .existence in 
principle, but it is not true that man does not have this 
possibility in fact: "When it is viewed from the standpoint of 
modern man's picture of himself and his world, his claim that 
authentic historicity is factually possible only in Jesus 
Christ must be regarded as just as incredible and irrelevant 
as the other myths with which it properly belongs. "61 But, 
contrary to Ogden, we should note that Bultmann has impressive 
authority on his side for maintaining this paradox of existence. 
For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, talking about original sin, is 
saying much the same thing when he maintains that although 
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sin is inevitable, it is not necessary. The same emphasis 
is part of the doctrine of original sin in the Formula of 
Concord, where it is inSisted that sin is not substance, but 
accident. Nevertheless, refusing to acknowledge that this 
inconsistency may be a necessary paradox (Thomas Oden has 
pointed out that Ogden is quite alone in his position62), 
Ogden goes on to formulate a "constructive alternative" to 
Bultmann's proposals. He suggests two principles toward this 
end. First, "the demand for demythologization that arises 
with necessity from the situation of modern man must be 
accepted without condition."63 This means that the kerygma 
too must be demythologized, and is essentially the same 
proposition as Burl had made. The second principle is that 
"the sole norm of every legitimate theological assertion is 
the revealed word of God declared in Jesus Christ, expressed 
in Holy Scriptures, and made concretely present in the 
proclamation df the church through its word and sacraments."' 
This sounds very conservative, and is indicative of Ogden's 
own inconsistency, or at least indicative of a failure on his 
part to express clearly what he has in mind. The candle is 
burning at both ends. After proposing this second prinoiple, 
he will again .go on to say that the only final condition for 
sharing in authentic life is "a condition that can be formulated 
in complete abstraction from the event Jesus of Nazareth and 
all that it specifically imports."65 This condition is that 
one "must understand himself in the concrete situations of 
his existence in the authentic way that is an original 
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possibility of his life before God."66 The fact that Ogden 
had not fully satisfied his own standards for constructive 
suggestions does not mean that what he has to say is not 
worthwhile and thought-provoking reading. There are a number 
of rather enigmatic hints at the implications of his sugges-
tions. Although it is true that even in his subsequent ar-
ticles he still has not accomplished his purposes satisfac-
torily (an indicative statement appears in a 1963 article--
"The whole meaning of this [Chris] event is to express or 
reveal God's transcendent love as the sole basis of our authen-
tic existenceu67), Thomas Oden's comment about him is generous 
and fair--"His discussion may increasingly be recognized as 
perhaps the most decisive affirmation of the grace of God as 
Creator in contemporary theological literature."68  
It is interesting to note that a very cautious conserv-
atism goes right along in insisting that if we allow Bultmann's 
position, we must allow Ogden's. There can be no temporizing, 
no qualifications. Commenting on Christ Without Myth, K. 
Runia says, 
It cannot be denied that this view is 
consistent. We for ourselves believe 
that this is indeed the logical outcome 
of Bultmann's starting point. Bultmann 
himself may not draw these-conclusions, 
but it was to be expected that others would 
go further. In the long run half-way 
positions cannot be maintained.°9  
For this kind of criticism, it is apparently inconceivable 
that one can demythologize and still remain a Christian, 
that one can acknowledge. the pervading influence of the 
world view of the first 
century in the Scriptural materials and still claim that the 
kerygma must be maintained and that.God has acted supremely 
and decisively in Jesus Christ. John Macquarrie has approached 
this problem with great insight in his The Scope of Demyth- 
oloFizing, and his conclusion is noteworthy: "The limit to 
demythologizing is nothing other than the recognition of the 
difference between a philosophy of human existence and a 
religion of divine grace."7°  
In addition to the liberal development of Bultmann's 
views by Buri and Ogden, there are two other significant 
trends which have developed from the theology which he 
originated--the new quest for the historical Jesus, and the 
implications of the later Heidegger for theology.71  
Perhaps the most important thing to note about the new 
quest is that its adherents insist that it is new. There is 
no attempt to come to the same conclusions as the nineteenth 
century quest or that of Albert Schweitzer. There are two 
major differences from the old quest: first, there is now a 
frank recognition that the sources are not coldly factual, 
biographical reports, but kerygma which tells us how the 
primitive church believed in and preached Jesus as the Lord; 
second, the emphasis in the old quest lay in establishing 
the distance between the Jesus of the Gospels and the Jesus 
of history, whereas the emphasis in the new quetit is establishing 
the unity between the Christ of the kerygma and the Jesus of 
history. It is easy enough to see how this stems from 
Bultmann. He has insisted that the kerygma be based on Jesus 
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of Nazareth, a concrete figure of history, even if the 
incarnation, atonement, and resurrection are mythological 
expressions through which one interprets existence, rather 
than objective statements about the life of Jesus. Now, 
still following Bultmann, the new quest asks to what extent 
the kerygma continues Jesus' understanding of Himself. This 
is not a question of His inner feelings, but of an understanding 
that overflowed into actions and words. This is an attempt 
to encounter the whole person of Jesus through the individual 
sayings and actions in which His intention and self hood are 
latent. This is accomplished by sifting the synoptic 
Gospels for the actual sayings and deeds of Jesus, and then 
examiang them for what they reveal about His self-understanding. 
In this process, everything is rejected that has a kerygmatic 
tone, since this may have been .composed by the church. Also 
excluded from consideration are any Gospel materials which 
could have arisen in contemporary Judaism. According to James 
M. Robinson's A New quest of the Historical Jesus (Robinson 
is the leading American figure in the movement), there are 
now two ways of gaining knowledge about the person of Jesus. 
One is the via kerygmatica--the church's kerygma presents an 
understanding of Jesus which it presupposes to be a continua- 
tion of His own understanding of Himself. The other is the 
via historica--modern historiography uses the non-kerygmatic 
material of the Gospel to reconstruct the self-understanding 
of the historical Jesus. Thus history, as well as the kerygma, 
offers to those who accept it the possibility of authentic 
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existence. The new questers claim they have established 
that Jesus intended a historical encounter with Himself to 
be an eschatological encounter with God, and that He conse-
quently understood His existence as that of bringer of 
eschatological salvation. This does not prove that the 
kerygma is true (which lies beyond proof and is in the realm 
of faith), but that the kerygma is faithful to Jesus. This 
optitistic appraisal of the situation has been undercut by 
Bultmann himself. He agrees that Jesus' own message may 
reveal a great deal about His understanding of existence, but 
this is ultimately irrelevant to faith. What is proclaimed 
by faith is not Jesus' understanding of existence, but the 
crucified and resurrected Christ. In Jesus' ministry we have 
only the promise; in the kerygma we have the eschatological 
fulfillment. It is the resurrection faith that turndothe""once" 
into the "once for all," that makes what Jesus did on Golgotka 
not lust a past event, but an event which is present. for me. 
Since Bultmann's criticism, others have been having second 
thoughts as well about the value of the new quest, and the 
movement which was so strong in the fifties has become less 
sure of itself in the sixties. 
The third trend following Bultmann is the attempt to 
translate the later philosophical thought of Heidegger (as 
opposed to the early Heidegger which Bultmann used) into 
theological research, a translation bringing into prominence 
the necessity of a "new hermeneutic." The leading figure in 
this movement is Heinrich Ott, wbo is much concerned with 
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establishing a mediating position between Barth and Bultmann. 
The shift in thought from the early Heidegger to the later 
Heidegger can best be characterized as a move from existen-
tialism to ontology, a shift of focus from human existence 
to the problem of being. itself. Authenticity is no longer 
understood as a living out of one's own proper potentialities, 
but as the sheer "letting be" of "what is." Ott sees this 
position of the later Heidegger as supporting Barth far 
more than Bultmann. As with Barth, the movement is away from 
the self and its understanding of existence toward that which 
is given. For the philosopher, this given is being; for the 
theologian, it is the revelation of God. Heidegger has taken 
his early characterization of human existence as care, with 
its carefUlly elaborated threefold structure of possibility, 
facticity, and fallenness, and shown how the anxiety in-
volved is due to the confrontation with nothing--both the 
nothing of meaninglessness and the final nothing of death. 
But now this in turn leads to the confrontation,with the 
wonder of being, the great insight that man's encounter with 
nothing leads to his realization of the reality of being. Man 
can escape anxiety by accepting what is. This means that the 
early existentialia are done away with, or are at best a step 
on the way to the knowledge of being. Ott is intent on 
showing that the freedom from all presuppositions indicates 
that theology should move beyond Bultmann in his extensive 
dependence on the philosophical presuppositions of the 
existentialia. Apparently Bultmann was appealing to a 
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philosophical position so incomplete as to be misleading. 
Furthermore, the truth of being expresses itself in language. 
Being speaks through man in language. Language uses man. 
This is why Heidegger places such an emphasis on poetry as a 
means of reaching the truth (an example is his interest in 
H8lderlin). The creative urge involved in poetry and the 
ability of poetic language to suggest is a way of being's 
unveiling itself. Here he is in accord with the modern 
literary theory of New Criticism, which, in speaking of the 
"intentional fallacy,-" makes the same point--one explicates 
a poem to find out what it says rather than to find out 
what the poet meant to say. It is this concern for language 
that introduces us to the "new hermeneutic," for language 
itself is hermeneutic. Bultmann. speaks of the necessity of 
hermeneutical presuppositions for theology, and here he 
refers, as we have said, to existential self-understanding 
as the point of reference for his own theology. But now the 
function of hermeneutic is vastly wider. Hermeneutic refers 
to the fact that being (or, to use Heidegger's suggested 
analogy for theology, God) reveals itself in man's language. 
For Bultmann, the real task of exegesis is to interpret the 
text. In the post-Bultmannian hermeneutic, the text interl-
prets us. The self-understanding found in the text leads to 
a criticism of one's own self-understanding. And this is 
not merely a presupposition, but rather a goal. 
How does this effect Bultmann's program of demythologiz-
ing? Certainly thb principle behind demythologizing, the 
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need to interpret the Scriptures in terms intelligible to 
modern man, is not abandoned. But Bultmann emphasizes that 
the Christian language of the New Testament has often 
become an obstacle to understanding. In the new hermeneutic 
the Biblical language, while it may not be identified with 
revelation, reveals God, and so Christian language is not 
irrelevant or optional. The problem is not so much that of 
demythologizing language so that Scripture is brought up to 
modern man; rather, modern man must be brought back to the 
Scripture so that his distorted relationships may be criti-
cized. There is less emphasis on the human element in lan-
guage and more on the relationship between language and 
being. 
This Isemzurelpeafte of the most fruitful directions to 
which Bultmann's theological emphases have developed, although 
he himself has so far dissociated himself from the movement. 
He has re-emphasized the fact that language speaks only in 
man's speaking, and has said that Ott and the others have 
minimized the inescapable relation of language to man. Al-
though this may be true, it is an objection that does not 
begin to come to terms with all the implications of the new 
hermeneutic (taLg. Heidegger speaks of man as being a "clearing 
for being"). It is also significant to note that although 
this new approach modifies Bultmann's work, it is no more 
amenable to Heilsgeschichte theology than he was, even though 
the Old Testament is again brought into serious consideration. 
Perhaps Gerhard von Rad's approach--the Word mediating the 
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event--will come into prominence in this area. We should 
also observe that Lutheran theology, emphasizing the role 
of the Word as a means of grace, can both learn and offer a 
great deal in the development of the new hermeneutic. 
Finally, in cantbevsrgned that although Bultmann's 
theology has been taken in an important new direction, his 
work has by no means been eclipsed. Much of what he has said 
about the existential interpretation of Scripture remains as 
valuable as it ever was. Most of his theology will be appli-
cable to the new situation, although perhaps in a modified 
form. All of his research remains as a monument to great 
scholarship. And the program for demythologization remains 
in force. In fact, if there is one major criticism to be made 
of Bultmann, it is that he has not taken myth seriously 
enough. To be sure, he has said again and again that 
"whereas the older liberals used criticism to eliminate the 
mythology of the New Testament our task to-day is to use 
criticism to interpret it."72 Yet one wonders if he has 
always really meant it. He qualifies this greatly when he 
says, "Myth indeed speaks of a reality, althOugh in an 
inadequate way."73 Bultmann almost seems ready to replace the 
myth with the existential interpretation of it. And this is 
where the criticism levelled at him by theologians of the left 
and right, by later Heideggerians and Tillichians, is extremely 
important. We cannot dispense with myth, saying that the 
existential interpretation is finally the only possible 
method of approaching it. Richard Grabau summarizes this 
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point quite well when he says, "No one who insists upon the 
necessity of myth implies that there are myths that cannot 
be existentially interpreted. The only thing implied is 
that the existential interpretation does not constitute or 
exhaust the myth."74 And again, 
Men have made many meanings out of myth: 
a literal, an allegorical, a moral, etc. 
Bultmann adds another: the existential. 
The difference between Bultmann and the 
earlier theologians is this. They thought 
that there really was myth and a plurality 
of interpretations which they tried to 
delineate. Each of the interpretations 
had its integrity and its function. None 
completely articulated the myth, nor did 
they all together. It remained always as 
the source of and control over the inter-
pretations. Bultmann on the other hand has 
no patience with this. He denies validity 
to any other interpretation than his own.-(5 
Ian Henderson was one of the first to make the same point for 
the English-speaking world before Bultmann's work was trans-
lated-- 
The mythological is a basic form of 
human thought from which, conse-
quently, we can never free our-
selves. It is the way in which the 
human mina works when it tries to 
apprehend and to describe religious 
objects. Myth is thus a legitimate 
form of human thought; it is, in fact, 
the only one in which tha,super-
sensible can be grasped.m 
The point of all this is that myth must be taken seri-
ously. This is the emphasis of the later Heideggerian 
pronouncements on language, and it is something that poets 
have always known. Myth cannot simply be equated with 
fiction, for the events of myth reveal depths of being 
which the intellect can see only obliquely. This is the 
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reason why the great nineteenth century poet, William Blake, 
embodied in his verse the Christian visions which he turned 
into a private mythology. William Butler Yeats employed 
Irish myths early in his poetic career, and then moved on to 
create his own mythology as a structure for his magnificent 
poetry. Similar examples abound. D. H. Lawrence's The 
Plumed Serpent is structured on elements of Christianity and 
the myth of the Mexican god Quetzalooatl. In Finnegans Wake, 
James Joyce fuses elements of classical, Christian, and 
Hebraic myths to create a universal myth which he felt would 
embody the experiences of all men. The function of myth as 
structural principle has been developed by Northrop Frye in 
his Anatomy of Criticism-- 
The mythical mode, the stories about gods, 
in which characters have the greatest 
possible power of actionki is the most ab-
stract and conventionalized of all 
literary modes, just as the corresponding 
modes in other arts--religious Byzantine 
painting, for example--show the highest 
degree of stylization in their structure. 
Hence the structural principles of litera-
ture are as closely related to mythology 
and comparative religion those of 
painting are to geometry. t(  
Behind this lies the basic principle that "the meaning or 
pattern of poetry is a structure of imagery with conceptual 
implications."78 Translating this into theological dis-
course--the Bible is mythology with conceptual implications. 
The task of theology is to uncover these conceptual impli-
cations, but this cannot be done at the expense of the 
mythology. A literary critic does not explicate Yeats's 
poems and then conclude that we can dispense with the structure 
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of imagery, the mythology, there. Ultimately this would 
mean that we could forget about the poems and just read the 
critic's essay--an option most readers would choose to 
bypass. This situation would be unattractive not only 
for aesthetic reasons (the rhythm and the radiance and the 
tightly-controlled organization would be lost), but also for 
reasons of truth (the poem would invariably be distorted as 
some elements are brought into undue prominence and others 
are forgotten completely). One appreciates the explication, 
the theology, for the aid to understanding that it provides, 
but one also realizes that the complete truth lies only in 
the poem, the mythology, as it is presented as the basic 
given. 
This analogy with poetry suggests again another criticism 
that has been directed at Bultmann, namely, that his program 
of demythologization leaves no reason to assume that the 
Christian myth is more authoritative than classical myth, or, 
for that matter, the mythology of William Butler Yeats. We 
have seen that Buri and Ogden would, in large measure, sub-
scribe to just this view and place poetry (in their case, 
philosophy) on the same level of revelation as theology. But, 
again, Bultmann, while acknowledging the power and truthful-
ness in secular affirmations, has insisted on preserving the 
kerygma, the historic core that God has acted in Jesus Christ, 
an action centering in the crucifixion and resurrection. In 
a manner of speaking, myth is fiction, and there is no scien-
tific method by which the objective happenings descrtbed in 
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the Christian myth can be verified while the objective 
happenings in other myths cannot. Here, as Bultmann con-
tinues to remind us, faith plays its part: "The action of 
God is hidden from every eye except the eye of faith. Only 
the so-called natural, secular (worldly) events are visible 
to every man and capable of proof. It is within them that 
God's hidden action is taking place."79 Understanding that 
Christian mythology will not be usurped by existential 
interpretation, we must nevertheless realize the compelling 
truth of this interpretation. As Bultmann says, 
"De-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God's 
mystery. The incomprehensibility of God lies not in the 
sphere of theoretical thought but in the sphere of personal 
existence. Not what God is in Himself, but how He acts with 
man, is the mystery in which faith is interested. "8° And 
further, the mystery of God lies not inthe fact that He 
"interrupts the natural course of events," but that He 
encounters me "in His Word as the gracious God."81  
"Our understanding of religion must be contemporary," 
says*John Macquarrie. 
By this we do not mean that it must 
conform to the philosophical vogue of 
the moment. But we mean that there 
can be no escape from the twentieth 
century to the times of the New Testa-
ment or of the Middle Ages or of the 
Reformation. No doubt we can learn 
much from all of these times. But 
what is required is an understanding 
of religion relevant to our own time, 
that is to say, an understanding 
which comes to grips with the problems 
which . . . the current mood of our 
civilization causes us to notice. 
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Hultmann's theology--and the later Heideggerian theology 
which develops from it--are contemporary in this best sense 
of the word. This paper has attempted to suggest that 
Hultmann's great contributions to contemporary theology 
have been twofold. First, there is his mature existential 
theology, which, if it is not understood as an exclusive or 
complete interpretation, brings a necessary accent of Scrip-
ture into the prominence it deserves. Second, there is his 
program of demythologization, a program which can be imple-
mented as the interpretation, not the elimination, of 
Christian myth. It is a program whioh enables the Gospel 
to speak to modern man with new power, for false and un-
necessary stumbling blocks have been removed. The corrective 
influence of the theology developed from the later Heidegger, 
the "new hermeneutic," is important here. As Krister 
Stendahi has observed, "Hultmann's plea for demythologizing--
regardless of the way in which he carries it out--is cer-
tainly here to stay."83 
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